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Abstract 
The presented study includes an analysis of the category of “good” on the basis of 
philosophy and economics. Particular attention was paid here to the factors deter-
mining the monetary value (price) of an economic good. While achieving the 
assumed objective of the research, answers to the following questions were 
sought: What is the difference, therefore, in the interpretation of good as an axio-
logical category and good which economics deals with? What is the basis for the 
valuation of goods which are the subject of economic analysis? While seeking 
answers to these questions, an attempt was made to justify the thesis according to 
which contemporary understanding of the way the market valuates goods is lim-
ited to accepting the price understood as a variable representing a kind of relation-
ship set in a given time period. 
Keywords: economics, ethics, history of economic thought, theory of value 
JEL Classification: B13, B40 
* The article is an updated version of the paper published in Polish in the Annales. Ethics in Economic 
Life, 18(3), 17–26.  
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1. Introduction
The following study provides an analysis of the valuation of goods based on phi-
losophy and its younger sister, economics.
1
 Economics, at least in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, evolved from moral studies.
2
 For a long time, the theory of value, 
which aims to explain the monetary value (price) of economic goods, also played 
an important role in the field. Thus, one may ask: how does the axiological reflec-
tion influence the way economists place values on goods? What is the basis for the 
valuation of goods that are subject to economic analysis? 
To answer these questions, the author attempts to support the thesis that the 
contemporary understanding of the way in which the market valuates goods is 
limited to accepting the price that is understood as a variable constituting a kind of 
relationship which is set in a given time period. The axiological dimension of the 
nature of goods is generally omitted in economic considerations, and the emphasis 
is put solely on the formalized process of their valuation. 
In order to prove the formulated thesis, the article presents how economists’ 
view on the valuation of economic goods have has changed, starting with the 
classical theory of value. Next, it points to the consequences of the Marginal Rev-
olution, which shifted the focus of considerations to the subjective aspects of the 
valuation performed by market participants. Developing the concept of the interest 
rate, the representatives of the Austrian school of economics and Irving Fisher 
showed the influence of the time factor on the valuation of goods. The value of a 
good was redefined owing to the supply-and-demand analysis of Alfred Marshall 
and the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. The evolution of economic 
concepts was examined in relation to the axiological assumptions in the field of 
philosophy. 
1 For more on the category of a goods through the prism of contemporary economics, cf. Malawski, 
2007. In his deliberations, the author starts with the broadly understood definition of the term, stating 
that “goods include all the resources that can be used directly or indirectly to satisfy human needs” 
(p. 154). 
2 David Hume is recognized as a leading representative of the Enlightenment philosophy owing to the 
works A Treatise of Human Nature (3 volumes 1739–1740) and An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (1748). Meanwhile, to economists, his most important work is the collection of essays 
entitled Political Discourses (1752). This collection includes, among other things, the following es-
says: Of Commerce; Of Money; Of Interest; and Of the Balance of the Trade, in which Hume outlined 
the quantitative theory of money and presented arguments for free trade. By developing these concepts, 
he contributed to the erosion of the mercantilist system, and at the same time, laid the foundations of 
the classical political economics. Adam Smith is considered the father of economics. Before he pre-
sented his main economic work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776), he was known as a philosopher thanks to The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Smith was 
never employed as a professor of economics. During his academic career, he chaired the Department of 
Logic at the University of Glasgow from January 1751, and less than a year later, in June 1752, he 
became the Head of Moral Philosophy. John S. Mill’s publication record is also the subject of philo-
sophical and economic analysis. Among his most influential works, philosophers enumerate A System 
of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843) and Utilitarianism; On Liberty (1861), whereas econo-
mists point to The Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philos-
ophy (1848). 
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2. The economic theory of value and axiology
Although the contemporary theory of economics, and especially its mainstream, 
avoid forming value judgments, the theory of value holds a central place in the 
classical works of economics. Trying to understand how prices are established, 




 centuries studied the issue from the perspective 
of the theory of value. They were looking for something that sets the price of 
a particular good that is understood as the monetary expression of its value. While 
it is difficult to find direct references to the ontological dimension of the existence 
of value in the economic analyses (as in the case of the contemporary axiology),
3
 
it is easy to observe two different positions regarding the source of the value of 
economic goods. The first one characterizes the tradition of classical political 
economics, which involves the search for the foundations of the value of econom-
ic goods as something that is objective and derives from the essence of this good. 
The value, in this sense, would be independent of the will of a valuing subject, 
which is, at the same time, an attribute of the object.
4
 
In Chapter 7 of The Wealth of Nations, titled Of the Natural and Market 
Price of Commodities, Adam Smith distinguishes between the market price—
which is variable by its very nature—and the natural price. When it comes to the 
essence of the natural price, he maintains that  
[it] is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are 
continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspend-
ed a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below 
it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this 
center of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it. (Smith, 
2007, Vol. 1, p. 70) 
The above demonstrates that Smith was looking for an explanation of the 
causes of establishing a price that would actually represent the value of 
a particular good. To the Scottish economist, demand factors are rather the cause 
of the deviation from the natural price, which results from the action of the supply 
forces that are identified with the inputs of production factors: land, capital and 
labour. Apart from Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx also tried to explain the 
value of an economic good by pointing to the source of its origin. Considering 
3 Even though ethical problems seen through the prism of philosophy have a long tradition dating back 
to ancient times, axiology emerged as a separate branch of philosophy at the end of the 19 th century, 
thanks to such thinkers as: J.F. Herbart, F.E. Beneke and R.H. Lotze. However, as Sosenko emphasiz-
es, the field of axiology was at its prime in the first half of the 20th century due to the works of Scheler, 
Hartmann and Ingarden. Cf. Sosenko, 1998, pp. 74–75. 
4 The philosopher and ethicist J. Pawlica, considering the problem of objectivity and subjectivity of 
value in the context of R. Ingarden’s views, draws attention to the ambiguity of the notions of objectiv-
ism and subjectivism. Among other definitions, he specifies, for example, that “objective is simply 
what occurs in the object, and subjective—in the subject, in other terms: objective exists independently 
of conscious experiences, while subjective—on the contrary, and objective does not change despite the 
changing experiences of the conscious subject, while subjective does change” (Pawlica, 1992, p. 541). 
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labour as the basic factor that gives value to manufactured goods led to a strong 
conflict between capital and labour in the 19
th
 century. The dispute concerned the 
justification of workers’ wages being low in comparison with the remuneration of 
capital as a factor of production. This, in turn, triggered a heated dispute related to 
the economic theory of distribution, in which some positive assertions appeared 
but also normative visions of a “just” socio-economic system clashed.  
Interestingly, even in the development period of neoclassical economics, there 
were endeavours to objectify the value of a good that is created in the production 
process. Constructing a neoclassical synthesis (combining the classical theory of 
value with the marginalist theory of value)

, Marshall attempted to formulate the 
concept of a representative firm (in the Polish translation of Principles of Econom-
ics, the term is rendered as “typical firm”). While he made a not entirely successful 
attempt at constructing the concept of a representative firm,
5
 he never presented 
a framework of an analogical theory with regard to consumer behaviour. And it is 
difficult to imagine “a representative consumer” if—in line with basic premises of 
neoclassical economics—we assume his or her independence. 
In the 1870s, the critique of classical economics provided a different perspec-
tive on the issue of the value of economic goods in the context of subjective assess-
ments of the agent. This way of thinking is mainly identified with the achievements 
of the Austrian School. The commentary made in this article is limited to the posi-
tion adopted by the founder of the Austrian school, Carl Menger. In 1871, he put 
forward the work titled Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [Principles of Eco-
nomics], in which the economist clearly states that  
value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent 
thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make about the im-
portance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and 
well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men. [...] 
Objectification of the value of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, has 
nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic principles of 
our science. (Menger, 2007, p. 121) 
Menger does not confine himself only to proposing a thesis of an ontological 
character, defining the nature of values. He asserts that the measure of value is of 
a subjective character as well. “Hence not only the nature but also the measure 
of value is subjective. Goods always have value to certain economizing individu-
als and this value is also determined only by these individuals” (Menger, 2007, 
p. 146).
 The term neoclassical synthesis is also used in connection with macroeconomics. In this context, it 
denotes the approach that emerged from J.R. Hicks’ interpretation of Keynes’s theory, which was 
presented in the article Mr Keynes and the Classics: A Suggested Interpretation (1937). Hicks’s depic-
tion of the matter (the IS-LM model) made it possible to combine the essential elements of the Keynes-
ian economics with the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics. (Editor’s note) 
5 It should be stressed that Marshall’s concept of a representative firm does not apply to the firm char-
acterized by the average costs associated with the activity in a given branch of industry. This concept is 
much broader and ambiguous. Cf. Marshall, 1925, pp. 305–306. 
ON THE VALUATION… 49 
Menger clearly indicates that the theory of value precedes the theory of price. 
The theory of prices, so strongly emphasized in contemporary economics, is simp-
ly a theory defining the ratio at which two goods exchange. Moreover, the econo-
mist criticizes the principle of equivalence in exchange—in the meaning assigned 
to it by classical economists (cf. Menger, 2007, pp. 183–184). 
The subjectivist standpoint allowed the theory of individual demand to be 
developed. The triangle presented by Menger showing the process of subjective 
assessment of the value of a given good soon turned into a formalized theory. 
Applying the so-called Gossen’s laws, economists determined the conditions for 
optimizing the exchange and formulated a demand curve based on the theory of 
marginal utility. Later, negating the psychological foundations of economics, they 
rejected the cardinal utility measurement method and advocated the ordinal utility 
approach, which excludes the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
The classical theory of value has its drawbacks, and the subjective theory of 
Marginalists has them as well. Assuming that the value of goods is determined by 
the amount of work or production costs, Classicists could not explain, in a con-
vincing way, the value of such goods as works of art. Furthermore, the presump-
tion that the value can be measured with labour causes numerous difficulties ow-
ing to the non-homogeneous character of labour. When it comes to the subjective 
theory of value, the problem lies in the fact that individuals can only determine the 
value of those goods which they directly consume. And as for other goods, e.g. 
factors of production, their value was to come from the final goods. It engaged 
economists—especially German-speaking ones—in the dispute over the so-called 
theory of imputation. 
In the 1890s, Marshall made attempts to reconcile these mutually exclusive 
economic traditions. He took up a stance that was a compromise, according to 
which neither the production cost nor usability is a premise that can, by itself, 
determine the value of a particular good. Only if the two variables (representing 
supply and demand, respectively) are taken into consideration are we able to un-
derstand the essence of the value of economic goods. To illustrate the idea, 
he made the well-known comparison to scissors that cut a piece of paper. Just as 
the two scissor blades cut the paper simultaneously, supply and demand factors 
both participate in determining the value of goods (prices) (cf. Marshall, 1925, 
pp. 332–333). 
Marshall’s concept still appears in textbooks of microeconomics since it 
changed economists’ view on the whole process of valuing goods. Gradually, 
economists began to leave out the philosophical, axiological perspective, and 
shifted the focus of the analysis to the price theory explained within the frame-
work of physically interpreted equilibrium models. In this sense, prices are under-
stood as relationships which constitute a parameter that allows rational agents to 
optimize their decisions. 
Just as axiological objectivism corresponds to the classical theory of value, 
and axiological subjectivism to the theory of marginalism, the neoclassical synthe-
sis relates to the views of axiological relationism. In line with axiological relation-
ism, value is neither something objective, an immanent feature of the object, nor a 
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subjective evaluation of the subject. The value exists in the context of the subject-
object relationship. According to Wiśniewski, this view is reflected in the works 
of Roman Ingarden (cf. Wiśniewski, 2009, pp. 166–167). More recently, the 
standpoint is represented by Lipiec (1992, p. 13), who claims that:  
Value is generated by the object, but only when this object bears a relationship 
to a human being. Value has therefore a twofold basis for the existence: its carri-
er is, firstly, the subject and, secondly, the subject-object relationship whose 
subjective component (the human) becomes aware of the value of the object and 
of the existence of the relationship itself, in which the value appears as a “for” 
property—for him or her, the subject.  
The fundamental difference between Marshall’s theory and axiological rela-
tionism is that the former deals with the way value is determined—a human dis-
covers value based on how markets interact. Meanwhile, in philosophy, the repre-
sentation of the subject matter focuses on uncovering the nature of value in an 
ontological manner. Since the late 19
th
 century, economists have been less and less 
interested in the very nature of value, limiting themselves to the problem of valua-
tion, and the dispute that arose from this revolved around the scale for the margin-
al utility of consumed goods and services. 
Despite the fact that Marshall, the author of the model of partial equilibrium, 
gave rise to the idea of value as a type of relation, the concept was fully developed 
in the context of Walras’ model of general equilibrium, especially in the works of 
Kenneth J. Arrow and Gérard Debreu (cf. Arrow & Debreu, 1954, pp. 265–290). 
Thanks to the formalist narrative of their works, the concept took its most mature 
form. When in 1983 Gérard Debreu was awarded the Swedish National Bank’s 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, the press release stated 
that not only was it given to him “for having incorporated new analytical methods 
into economic theory and for his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general 
equilibrium”, but also that the economist contributed to, among other things, gain-
ing a different perspective on the category of good. In the opinion of Malawski, it 
was Debreu who made the most significant contribution to the process of the axi-
omatization of the general equilibrium theory, in the scope of which good is con-
sidered a primitive notion (Malawski, 2007). 
What greatly influenced the separation of the economic theory of value from 
the axiological reflection was the introduction of the time factor into the economic 
analysis. These postulates were developed by both, Menger and Marshall; yet, it 
was in the works of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Irving Fisher that their out-
comes were fully demonstrated. The first author conveyed his views in the work 
entitled Kapital und Kapitalzins. Positive Theorie des Kapitales (1889). Although 
the main inspiration for the theory of interest by the Austrian economist was the 
valuation of capital goods, it can easily be applied to all type of goods involved in 
trading. Böhm-Bawerk asserts that “present goods are, as a rule, worth more than 
future goods of like kind and number. This proposition is the kernel and center of 
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the interest theory which I have to present” (von Böhm-Bawerk, 1891, p. 237).6 
Thus, the value of goods is determined by the time preference that stands for the 
willingness to obtain present goods rather than future goods, the consequence of 
which should be expressed as a percentage—agio. The theses proposed by Böhm-
Bawerk were developed by Fisher, who, having a better mathematical background 
than his Austrian predecessor, was able to present the interest rate in a more math-
ematical manner. The outline of his interest rate concept was presented in 1907 in 
The Rate of Interest, and its extended version in The Theory of Interest (1930). 
This economist argues that the interest rate is a measure of the price that individu-
als are willing to pay to get income today and not in the future. Fisher employs 
important categories in the depiction of his idea: impatience and opportunity. The 
former was to replace Böhm-Bawerk’s term agio (cf. Fisher, 1930, pp. VIII–IX). 
Formulating their concepts, both Böhm-Bawerk and Fisher strongly empha-
sized the idea that the limited availability of goods combined with impatience may 
be an important element of valuation. Nowadays, people are not content with the 
simply obtaining goods according to their own scale of preference. Increasingly, 
they want to have things right here and right now. This impatience makes us pay 
more and more attention not only to what we have, but also to when certain goods 
will be available to us. It directly stimulates the development of credit institutions, 
which are willing to fulfil these expectations for a specific remuneration expressed 
as an interest rate. Today, time is becoming an increasingly significant value-
creating agent. To a large extent, it changes the value of a good that is established 
by an interaction between the determinants of supply and demand. Figure 1 illus-
trates the evolution of the approach to the valuation of economic goods, taking 
into account the economic and the axiological perspectives, and considering the 
influence of time.  
In economics, the considerations on time as a value-creating factor were lim-
ited to devising mathematised techniques which allow people to establish how the 
value of goods changes over time. The idea has never been analysed in depth in 
relation to economics or axiological reflection. Philosophers usually interpret time 
on the epistemological level, with regard to the development of physics and math-
ematics. The example of such an approach is found in the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant, who sees time and space as a priori categories of the mind that enable the 
perception of reality. In contemporary philosophy, much less thought is given to 
the implementation of time in the context of how contemporary man perceives 
value. 
6 The English version of Böhm-Bawerk’s work is the translation of the second part of his book Kapital 
und Kapitalzins. Positive Theorie des Kapitales (1889). 
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Fig. 1. The axiological and economic approach to value 
3. Conclusions
Ethical and axiological matters were present in the deliberations of economists 
almost since the very moment the field of economics started developing. The 
central problem of economics was the theory of value, as it was a starting point for 
the analysis of the prices of goods and services. Initially, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, there was a strong tendency to make the value of goods and ser-
vices objective. The subjective approach entered into the scholars’ discussion as 
a result of the Marginal Revolution, and over time, it progressively gained more 
support. Thanks to Marshall’s neoclassical synthesis, the objective and the subjec-
tive approaches were combined into the demand-supply scheme of the market, 
which is now a widely shared view on the process of price formation.  
Contemporary economics, especially those referred to as mainstream eco-
nomics, rarely talk explicitly about the ontological dimension of the existence of 
value. It restricts itself to studies on the valuation process performed by rational 
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agents. The concept understood in this way lost its philosophical depth and let go 
of the axiological approach to value. Its place was taken by a formalized analysis 
of the price formation process in the market. 
While reflecting on the theory of value, one should bear in mind yet another 
factor which is not included in the economic and philosophical analyses—the time 
factor. Up to now, the depiction of time on a philosophical plane was mainly asso-
ciated with its epistemological dimension within the framework of the philosophy 
of mathematics and physics. In the sphere of economics, on the other hand, the 
analysis of how important time is boils down to the use of algorithms that allow us 
to estimate how the value of a good changes over time. Perhaps this is a reflection 
on the way economizing subjects valuate goods, enriched with the time dimen-
sion, which could provide a solid basis for economic as well as philosophical 
research. 
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